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Abstract
This article analyzes the Canadian werewolf film Ginger 
Snaps (2000) through various feminist lenses at the in-
tersection of sex, gender, and sexuality. While academic 
scholarship on the film at this particular intersection is 
extremely limited, articles that read Ginger Fitzgerald’s 
transformation into werewolf and menstruating female 
as empowering dominate the field. The following, how-
ever, moves to trouble such structural readings based 
in identity-politics and offers, in addition, a reading of 
political possibilities generated from poststructural ap-
proaches to monstrosity.
Résumé
Cet article analyse le film de loup-garou canadien Gin-
ger Snaps (2000) par le biais de différentes optiques 
féministes à l’intersection du sexe, du genre et de la sex-
ualité. Bien que la recherche universitaire sur le film à 
cette intersection en particulier soit extrêmement lim-
itée, les articles qui dominent le domaine interprètent 
la transformation de Ginger Fitzgerald en loup-garou 
et en femme menstruée comme donnant un sentiment 
de pouvoir. Ce qui suit, toutefois, cherche à déranger 
ces lectures structurelles ancrées dans la politique iden-
titaire et offre, en outre, une lecture des possibilités ju-
dicieuses générée des approches post-structurales à la 
monstruosité.
Caelum Vatnsdal (2004), in his history of Ca-
nadian horror cinema entitled They Came from With-
in, credits Ginger Snaps (2000) for giving some “bad-
ly needed” relevance to the words “Canadian horror 
movie” in the twenty-first century. The werewolf film, 
according to Vatnsdal, is “good, solid, intelligent en-
tertainment” that also “redress[es] the vast gender im-
balance in the Canadian horror field” (222). The film 
focuses on the teenaged Fitzgerald sisters who reside in 
Bailey Downs—a fictitious Canadian suburb in which 
neighborhood dogs are being eviscerated by an un-
known creature that prowls at night. One evening, after 
the sisters ignore parental advice to stay inside, a were-
wolf attacks and bites Ginger, the eldest who has recent-
ly begun to menstruate. Her sister Brigitte frightens off 
the creature with a flash from her Polaroid camera, and 
the werewolf runs onto a nearby road and is then killed 
by Sam, a local marijuana dealer who hits the creature 
while driving his van. The remainder of the film focuses 
on Ginger’s linear transformation into a werewolf, Sam’s 
and Brigitte’s attempts at curing Ginger, and the alter-
ations in the sisters’ relationship that ultimately ends 
with Brigitte stabbing and killing Ginger once she has 
fully transformed.
“With Ginger Snaps, which was directed by John 
Fawcett, a man, but written by Karen Walton, a woman,” 
notes Vatnsdal (2004), “at least a strong female point of 
view is getting a look in” (222). While Vatnsdal does not 
elaborate on this apparent female gaze, the film most 
obviously features two sisters—Ginger and Brigitte Fitz-
gerald—and focuses predominantly on their intimate 
relationship after Ginger is bitten by the Beast of Bailey 
Downs and is infected with a werewolf virus. Humor-
ously, Ginger reads her body’s linear alterations, such as 
the hair that grows from her attack wound followed by 
her aggressive sexual desire, as effects of menstruation. 
Indeed, it is Ginger’s bleeding female body that enables 
the comic relief generated out of the parallel between 
both “curses”—that of the werewolf and that of men-
struation. Ginger Snaps, then, represents a necessary 
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feminist intervention into what Vatnsdal refers to as a 
genre dominated by “adolescent-boy miasma” (222). 
Ginger’s menstruating body accentuates female rather 
than male adolescence, and, in the process, her female 
anatomical maturation acts, at least superficially, as the 
foundational axis of the werewolf film. 
Modern feminist readings of Ginger Snaps that 
expose and emphasize the gendered and sexed gap in 
the predominantly male-centered werewolf film, how-
ever, tend also to repeat the practice of exclusion so 
inherent in any identity-based reading. Like any sign, 
an identity, regardless of its representative marginal-
ized status, gains its meaning through difference, or 
through what it is not. Signification, then, intrinsically 
excludes and tends to sustain individuation and a di-
vide-and-conquer logic. Scholarship that focuses spe-
cifically on representations and readings of “woman” 
in Ginger Snaps, while recovering a sexed/gendered 
presence formerly neglected in the werewolf genre, also 
tends to sidestep such problematic dimensions of iden-
tity formation. This article, then, first maps feminist 
scholarship on Ginger Snaps that shares a specific focus 
on woman/female embodiment at the site of the were-
wolf. Such identity-based readings are significant in 
that they reveal the erasure of women as central, agen-
tial characters in a genre dominated historically by hy-
per-masculinity (Oswald 2013). The article then moves 
to consider the complications that result from reading 
the film with such a specific, exclusionary focus. 
While feminist identity-based readings work to 
recover female presence and empowerment, they also 
tend to stabilize identity as the core of subject-being. 
Feminist poststructural theory, however, has decon-
structed the identity “woman” since the 1990s, arguing 
its instability as an identity sign as opposed to its recov-
ery at the center of feminist politics. Significantly, this 
feminist theoretical approach to meaning production 
parallels the werewolf itself; with its emphasis on slip-
pery signification, feminist poststructuralism like any 
monster is “dangerous” in that both threaten “to smash 
distinctions” and reject “any classification built on hi-
erarchy or a merely binary opposition” (Cohen 1996, 
6-7). Moving away from identity-based readings of 
Ginger Snaps that rely on systemic binary logic, the fol-
lowing argument delves into a survey of distinct histor-
ical shifts in feminist theory that enable readings of the 
film that emphasize not only variability, but necessary 
mutability at the site of the monstrous body, an empha-
sis generated at the intersection of feminist poststruc-
turalism and monster theory. Ginger Snaps, after all, is 
not simply a film with discernable girl/woman charac-
ters at its center; it is a werewolf film—a genre with an 
expectation of instability and transformation at the site 
of the body. It seems strange, then, to focus on the re-
covery of any static identity (or even identities) as the 
essence of such a monstrous ontological liminality. By 
far the most cited scholar of monster theory, Jeffrey Co-
hen (1996), argues that, historically, discursively-pro-
duced monstrous bodies including the werewolf ’s actu-
ally “resist attempts to include them in any systematic 
structuration” (6). Judith Halberstam (2006) contends 
as well in her analysis of the Gothic that “monsters are 
meaning machines” that have been reduced to and sub-
sumed by identities of sexuality and gender only since 
the early twentieth century (21). As all identity signs of 
marginalization gain meaning through difference and 
lose value through the binary logic so foundational to 
Western thought, the following argument moves away 
from recovering a litany of static identities of Other, 
including that of “woman,” at the site of the werewolf 
in Ginger Snaps. After all, according to Cohen (1996), 
monstrous bodies represent “harbingers of category 
crisis” (6). Offered up in the following pages, then, is an 
edgy reading of the werewolf in Ginger Snaps, a map-
ping of the un/intelligible as both threatening and po-
litically productive in its liminality, its focus not on the 
Other but on the modern subject-viewer.
Identity Lost and Recovered
With regard to identity-focused readings of the 
film, there is little doubt that one of the primary rea-
sons Ginger Snaps generates scholarship based in the 
identity of woman is its hard-to-miss focus on female 
adolescence, specifically Ginger’s menstruation. While 
the horror genre tends to include blood as a staple, this 
particular bleeding body, of course, is not the every-
day-body that bleeds in horror films. Rather, through a 
feminist lens, Ginger’s body can be read as an example 
of Julia Kristeva’s (1982) concept of the abject in were-
wolf form. The abject, for Kristeva, consists not of the 
Other, but of that which consistently haunts the mod-
ern subject’s apparent stability and autonomy, both of 
which are dependent on the negation of the maternal 
(bleeding) body in psychoanalysis. Kristeva’s feminist 
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theory mapped in Powers of Horror (1982) represents 
a critical commentary on the mother-child relation-
ship discursively produced as necessarily nullified in 
the pursuit of subjectivity, particularly according to the 
theories of Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan. 
Probably the most influential feminist interven-
tion into the horror genre, Barbara Creed’s (1993) the-
oretical concept of the “monstrous-feminine,” of which 
Kristeva’s abject is foundational, refers to the collapse 
of the cinematic monster and the bleeding female body 
as a visual embodiment that threatens the stability of 
the male subject/viewer. In exposing the fragility of the 
male subject and, in the process, locating the power to 
do such in the monstrous female body, Creed’s mon-
strous-feminine generates a specific focus on female 
empowerment—not merely castrated, but castrator. 
Critical analyzes of Ginger Snaps at the intersection of 
sex, gender and sexuality, while extremely limited in 
number, also tend to read Ginger as a version of the fe-
male empowerment Creed recovers in her theory of the 
monstrous-feminine. This identity-based scholarship 
locates, positively, women marginalized by the param-
eters of proper female embodiment in a genre Vatnsdal 
(2004) refers to as lacking “where feminism and gender 
politics are concerned” (222).
April Miller (2005), for instance, argues that 
Ginger’s simultaneous transformation into “menarchal 
woman and werewolf ” in Ginger Snaps “contributes to 
the repressive discourses of sexuality that shackle wom-
en to reproduction,” but the film also promisingly em-
ploys the werewolf as a metaphor “for the limits placed 
on female sexual subjectivity” (281). Throughout the 
film, menstruation is depicted as a transformation un-
derstood in terms of taboo, betrayal, biological necessi-
ty, celebration, medical mechanics, toxic waste, a curse 
and, predominantly for Ginger and Brigitte, a threat to 
self-identity. The sisters gain their sense of self through 
resistance to the middle-class normality of Canadian 
suburbia; in particular, they identify as different from 
other high school girls whose gender performance re-
flects the heteronormative, its primary objective the 
male gaze. In other words, while menstruation serves 
to differentiate “men” from “women,” the process also 
“implies homogeneity of experience and implicates all 
women in the reproductive process” (290).
Ginger and Brigitte prioritize distance from 
such homogeneity through their perpetual resistance. 
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Complementary to the sisters’ refusal to be contained 
by maps of normality, according to Miller (2005), is the 
deluge of discourse regarding menstruation that runs 
throughout the film, various references that actually ex-
pose not only blatant contradictions and inconsistencies 
regarding menses, but the fact that no single narrative 
can contain the meaning of such a transformation. Not 
unlike the lycanthrope that bites Ginger and sends Bri-
gitte and Sam in search of a cure, no single discourse—
not werewolf folklore, not biology, nor Hollywood cine-
ma—works to contain Ginger’s werewolf virus. Neither, 
as her psyche alters throughout her physical transfor-
mation, is Ginger’s sexual subjectivity shackled to the 
reproductive process. Eventually not only does Ginger 
reject the “limited subject positions available” to her, 
but she “derives pleasure from her monstrous identity 
and the power and sexual satisfaction it affords” (281-
282). Miller argues that Ginger Snaps, in demystifying 
both werewolf mythology and menstruation biology, 
enables “radical forms of female sexual consciousness” 
in the process (281). What Judith Butler (1990) refers 
to as the heterosexual matrix—in this specific case the 
disciplined interdependence between the natural mat-
uration of the female body, proper womanhood, and 
procreative sexuality—is actually troubled by its con-
nection to the werewolf. Such a parallel, after all, associ-
ates the heterosexual matrix with the werewolf, or, more 
specifically, with monstrous myth. 
Tanis MacDonald (2011) agrees that Ginger 
Snaps magnifies the physical changes associated with 
menstruation to expose heteronormative femininity as 
socially constructed. In its connecting “the biological 
changes of puberty” with “transbiological metamor-
phosis,” Ginger Snaps reflects a B-movie tradition, but 
one that recognizes that “becoming a woman is not the 
social or sexual equivalent of becoming a man” (66). For 
MacDonald, the “real horror show” foundational to the 
film is the “brand of gender normativity that threatens 
to trap” the sisters (61). In locating disciplined perfor-
mative gender as heteronormative, MacDonald links 
Ginger’s bleeding body to transgressive gender as well 
as to transgressive sexual desire and, in the process, en-
ables a recovery of lesbian representation absent from 
scholarship on the film. MacDonald contends, along 
with Thomas Waugh (2006), that a “cultural refusal” 
to read lesbian existence in films, particularly those set 
outside urbanity, is nothing less than “‘our failure of the 
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imagination’” (123). MacDonald (2011) further argues 
that locating the adolescent lesbian in Ginger Snaps is 
“urgent,” “given the growing concern over crises faced 
by queer youth” (63). While Miller (2005), referenced 
above, recognizes, but certainly also underplays, the 
possible “homoerotic undertones” of the sisters’ rela-
tionship (287), MacDonald (2011) argues that such an 
unnamed same-sex desire runs throughout the film, 
opening up a “choice to read the Fitzgerald sisters as 
an erotic couple,” rather than settle for “the film’s femi-
nist examination of the menstrual monster,” which she 
argues is actually “arrested half-way through the film” 
(62). 
MacDonald (2011) maps particular instances 
in Ginger Snaps to uncover a lesbian presence, despite 
the fact that the sexual identity goes unnamed in the 
film. The navel-piercing scene, during which Brigitte, 
attempting to cure her sister, straddles Ginger’s body to 
penetrate her navel with a silver earring—a scene which 
includes images of Ginger grasping the bedposts and 
writhing under her sister’s body to the “accompanying 
wail of an electric guitar”—is the most obvious (71). For 
MacDonald, the scene “confirms the subtext of lesbian 
desire” (71). Not only are the erotic undertones far more 
overt in this scene, but, as MacDonald notes, this dis-
play of seeming same-sex pleasure also directly follows 
(and undercuts) Ginger’s first heterosexual encounter. 
Notably a “disappointment,” this encounter with Jason 
McCarty is one in which Ginger eventually submits to 
the submissive, passive role she must occupy in heter-
onormativity despite her initial attempt at an aggressive 
“gender reversal” in the back seat of Jason’s Volvo sta-
tion wagon (71). Additionally, MacDonald recognizes 
the sisters’ “incestuous homoeroticism” in their blood 
pact—“Out by sixteen or dead in this scene: together 
forever, united against life as we know it” (59). Read by 
MacDonald as an “erotic connection” “nearly ignored” 
by traditional scholarship, the author turns to social 
media to uncover the sisters’ blood oath of intimacy 
as an “open secret among fans of the film” (59). Mac-
Donald reads the reference to “Out by sixteen” as the 
variety of ways in which the sisters can “defy contain-
ment”; in particular, the oath represents “an encoded 
speech act that conflates the state of being “out” (of the 
closet and suburbia)” (64). As well, despite her turning 
into a werewolf, Ginger does not kill “indiscriminately,” 
according to MacDonald, but rather “according to the 
fractured logic of jealousy” (71). Ginger eviscerates only 
men whom she understands to be interested sexually in 
Brigitte, men she perceives as “barriers to her desire to 
be ‘together forever’” with her sister (72). Stated quite 
simply by MacDonald, “Brigitte is the love object here” 
(72). 
These identity-based readings of Ginger Snaps 
produced by Miller (2005) and MacDonald (2011) 
represent scholarship crucial in locating marginalized 
female subjects of transgressive genders and sexual de-
sires in more empowering roles. In such analytical ap-
proaches, Ginger and Brigitte Fitzgerald expose the dis-
ciplinary mechanisms inherent in what Butler (1993) 
refers to as the heterosexual imperative by destabilizing 
any single truth regarding a gender and sexuality for 
all girls and women, and they certainly represent a ver-
sion of feminist empowerment through resistance. In 
recovering an embodied resistance at the identity sites 
of “girl,” “woman,” “lesbian,” and monster, these read-
ings reflect what Simone de Beauvoir (1989) requested 
of women in the mid-twentieth century—that is, the 
refusal to be the devalued Other of sex/gender differ-
ence. Exposing sex/gender difference between men and 
women as far from symmetrical, Beauvoir argues such 
an apparently natural distinction acts as an illusion gen-
erated out of masculinist discourse historically. While 
“man” occupies the position of the Subject, the Abso-
lute, in such a discursive binary scheme, “woman” is 
allocated the position of the object, or Other, which en-
sures her inferior definition in relation to man. Wom-
an’s position of devalued Other is fixed, states Beauvoir, 
by the prevailing discourse of the Eternal Feminine that 
defines woman by her body alone, in particular by her 
reproductive capacity or her womb. In such a scheme, 
masculinist discourse of the Eternal Feminine (also ref-
erenced as the Myth of Woman) represents the female 
body as lack and is used to deny woman any authentic 
subject position, thereby ensuring her position as fixed 
Other. Both Miller (2005) and MacDonald (2011) rec-
ognize the association between Ginger’s bleeding body 
and monstrosity that frames the film. And, much like 
Creed’s (1993) theory of the monstrous-feminine, both 
scholars also locate various forms of empowerment in 
this bleeding female body. Perhaps, then, an answer 
to Beauvoir’s mid-twentieth-century request, readings 
that emphasize Ginger’s monstrous ability to embrace 
the sign of “woman” in anti-heteronormative ways re-
www.msvu.ca/atlantisAtlantis 37.2 (2), 2016 126
jects the discourse of the Eternal Feminine. This resis-
tance and rereading dislodge the bleeding female body 
from its fixed position of object, enabling a far less sta-
ble signification of “woman” and, in turn, a far more 
complicated subject position.
The Body Destabilized
Such identity-based readings, as mentioned 
above, are limited in their scope of representation. 
Since the 1990s, feminist theory has included more 
contemporary understandings of identity politics as 
limited and exclusionary and has had to consider more 
poststructural approaches to identity that emphasize 
its provisionality rather than its essence. Building on 
Michel Foucault’s (1979) assertion that identity-sub-
jects are discursively produced within juridical sys-
tems of power, Butler’s (1990) Gender Trouble notori-
ously challenges the term “woman” as a stable identity 
on which feminist theory and politics could be based. 
Her feminist scholarship insists that “woman,” the 
subject of feminism, is an effect of discourse, or “dis-
cursively constituted by the very political system that 
is supposed to facilitate its emancipation” (354). In-
deed, both “woman” and “lesbian” represent identity 
formations that are not only institutionally (and even 
communally) pre-determined, but are also inherent-
ly exclusive as both require significations historically 
dependent on what they are not. Butler (1996), then, 
calls not for the total erasure of political identity, but 
for a different foundation for feminist politics and the 
provisionality of the identity sign—an acknowledge-
ment of “woman” as inclusive of its exclusions that 
have been determined by juridical regulatory regimes. 
As demonstrated above by Vatnsdal (2004) who cred-
its Karen Walton, a woman with the female perspective 
and feminist content of Ginger Snaps, the stabilization 
of gender identity is dependent upon an assumed 
shared, authentic experience of “woman” (222). Not 
only does Vatnsdal’s argument stabilize what “wom-
an” means in some apparently universalizing way, his 
statement also completely denies John Fawcett, the 
man any feminist savvy despite his having directed the 
film. As identity most often reflects a primary marker 
of difference, identity-based readings of any text often 
result in such exclusions due to their reliance on stable 
signifiers of difference more often than not generated 
out of binary (either/or) logic. 
Feminist theory has, of course, complicated such 
a static logic of exclusionary difference by exposing the 
interdependency of absolute distinctions in significa-
tion processes. Hence, the apparent universal difference 
in the meaning of “woman” in Vatnsdal’s (2004) state-
ment relies both on binary logic and on his assumed sig-
nification of “man.” This interdependence complicates 
any absolute difference between the two; “woman” and 
“man” are discursively relational, not entirely distinct. 
Inherent in the identity-based analyses of Ginger Snaps 
by both Miller (2005) and MacDonald (2011), then, is 
also a core reliance on absolute sex/gender difference 
that enables such readings. Stressed in this scholarship, 
first and foremost, is the female body that is not the male 
body of typical B-movie werewolf films. Granted, these 
scholars do recover a resistance to the Eternal Feminine 
in the menstruating body of Ginger who defies maps of 
normative gender and sexuality and, in the process, re-
fuses her role of Other, or fixed sexed object, despite her 
bleeding body. Read together, the scholarship produced 
by Miller and MacDonald works to rupture any singular, 
static meaning of “woman.” MacDonald’s (2011) work 
more specifically maps a variety of “female relationships 
in all their queer(ed) intensity” (76), but both scholars 
locate and accentuate the denial to be contained that is 
foundational to the characterization of the Fitzgerald 
sisters. Heteronormative discourse is exposed as not a 
singular truth, but as a technology designed to secure 
understandings of menstruation, gender performativi-
ty, and sexual desire. And, in doing so, both Miller and 
MacDonald fracture the apparently fixed signifier of 
“woman” secured by historical masculinist discourse 
into a far more complex subject of multiple gender and 
sexual performances and various identity markers. But, 
ironically, their recovery of such empowered diversity 
also excludes as it includes, for such readings rely on the 
allegedly stable female form.
One of Butler’s (1990) most notable sub-argu-
ments in Gender Trouble implicates feminists in their 
own destabilization of the identity “woman” founda-
tional to feminist theory and politics. She locates the 
feminist distinction between gender and sex—gender 
understood as a social construction and sex as biologi-
cal—as an example of how feminist theory has already 
destabilized the unity of the identity “woman.” But But-
ler then challenges this same binary opposition to fur-
ther deconstruct the unity of “woman” “often invoked 
to construct solidarity of identity” (356). She argues 
against the naturalization of the binary of sex by locat-
ing its production in an either/or logic generated from 
within the apparatus of gender. “Gender ought not to be 
conceived merely as the cultural inscription of mean-
ing on a pre-given sex,” she argues; rather, “gender must 
designate the very apparatus of production whereby the 
sexes themselves are established” (357). In other words, 
the binary logic inherent in the apparatus of gender—
man and woman—also produces the knowledge of any 
pre-discursive and natural stable sex distinction—male 
and female. While Miller (2005) and MacDonald (2011) 
do destabilize the meaning of “woman” by mapping 
various gender and sexual performances that, in turn, 
recover positive representations of multiple embodied 
identity markers, they do so by inscribing these identi-
ties onto a stable (and assumed) female body. Ginger’s 
bleeding body is reproduced as a stable signifier, one 
historically and institutionally assumed pre-discursive 
and natural, a foundation onto which resistant gender 
and sexual performances can be read. Rather than a 
variable in itself, the female body is the foundation on 
which these readings of resistance rely.
According to Linda Nicholson (1994), the fem-
inist “legacy” to read the female body as pre-discursive 
and, therefore, naturally stable comes from an historical 
production of theories designed to counter biological 
essentialism, or the masculinist discourse that anchors 
all knowledge about women to the female body (80). 
Attacking Freudian anatomy-is-destiny assumptions 
and building on the work of Beauvoir (1989) discussed 
above, feminists in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s un-
dermined this discourse that fixed woman in the posi-
tion of inferior Other by producing gender as a social 
construction while maintaining sex as a natural bina-
ry. Most feminists accepted the truth of biological dis-
course that differentiated women from men at the site 
of anatomy (and most still do). Producing gender as 
variable while maintaining the sex distinction worked 
to stabilize and yet complicate “woman” as the subject 
of feminist politics. As Nicholson (1994) states, such 
a perspective “enabled feminists to assert differences 
as well as similarities among women”; in maintaining 
“biological commonality” represented by the body—
“that women have vaginas and men have penises”—sex 
could be considered a “cross-cultural phenomenon” 
between all women (81). 
Nicholson (1994), like Butler, however, cri-
tiques this feminist reliance on the stability of sex, not-
ing that “thinking of sex as independent of gender is 
the idea that distinctions of nature, at some basic lev-
el, ground or manifest themselves in human identity” 
(82). She credits feminists of the late 1960’s and early 
1970’s for mapping gender as a social construction, but 
she also critiques their inability to deconstruct the sta-
bility of sex. This limited feminist approach Nicholson 
labels “biological foundationalism,” which differs from 
biological determinism in that the former does not 
read the female body as that which fully determines 
“woman” (82). However, biological foundationalism is 
limited in its inability to recognize the body as variable. 
Such an understanding, argues Nicholson, represents 
a “coat rack view” of subject-identity in that the body 
represents a stable form upon which differences in 
culture, personality, and behavior are “thrown or su-
perimposed” (81). Key to Nicholson’s argument is her 
mapping of the discursively-produced and, therefore, 
unstable body. Referring to Thomas Laquer’s (1990) 
Making Sex that historicizes Western medical literature 
on the body since the Greeks, Nicholson highlights 
the body not as any singular and stable truth, but as a 
discursively-produced sign inherently variable. In ref-
erence to the reliance on the apparently natural bleed-
ing female body in identity-based analyses of Ginger 
Snaps, Laquer’s mapping of the human body as one sex 
prior to the eighteenth century is telling. Rather than 
an “altogether different creature,” medical discourse 
produced the (soon to be) specifically female body 
as an inferior variant of the male body. Menstruation 
did not refer to a distinct female process, but simply 
to “the tendency of human bodies to bleed, the orifice 
from which the blood emerged perceived as not very 
significant” (Nicholson 1994, 87). For Nicholson, then, 
sex distinction is discursively-produced and, therefore, 
unable to act as a solid foundation for feminist politics. 
Any apparently fixed meaning of bodily difference is 
contingent not on nature, but on discourse produced 
in specific historical and cultural contexts. Such a fem-
inist politic based in biological foundationalism, then, 
is, for Nicholson, both limited and exclusionary. 
One reason Nicholson destabilizes the female 
body is to offer another perspective for feminist pol-
itics. Reacting to the exclusivity inherent in the sex 
distinction foundational to much feminist theory and 
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politics—in particular, the anti-transsexual rhetoric of 
Janice Raymond’s (1979) Transsexual Empire—Nichol-
son (1994) calls for feminism to embrace a “coalition 
politics” that not only represents a political action fem-
inists “enter into with others,” but a political stance of 
alliance that is also always “internal” to feminism, one 
inclusive of MTF transsexual subjects (102). So, too, 
might identity-based readings that employ the natural 
female form as foundational, such as those of Ginger 
Snaps mapped above, benefit from further analyses of 
the text that destabilize the bleeding female body, those 
that recognize the body as discursively-produced and, 
therefore, always unstable. Such readings, not unlike 
Nicholson’s proposed feminist coalition, could open up 
connections between marginalized subjects traditional-
ly excluded from feminist politics due to rigid sex dis-
tinctions. 
Granted, one of the reasons academic scholar-
ship may not challenge the stable sexed body in Gin-
ger Snaps is because, quite frankly, read superficially, 
the film seems to stabilize distinctions associate with 
the traditional female form. During a scene in which 
Ginger straddles and seduces Sam, for instance, Ginger 
removes her clothing and exposes an enlarged rib cage 
and a chest complete with three sets of teats. Ginger’s 
body, despite its transforming from one species to an-
other, seemingly maintains its female anatomy even on 
its way to the animal kingdom. Reading this image in 
conjunction with several other scenes, however, under-
mines the assumed stability of sex distinction—both 
male and female—in the film and within the werewolf 
body. For example, Ginger infects Jason with her were-
wolf virus after the two have sex without a condom. The 
following day, Jason begins to bleed from his genitals. 
Miller (2005) refers to Jason’s bleeding body as his trans-
formation into a “spectacle” of “the ‘hysterical’ men-
struating woman” (294). Miller’s reading is supported 
in a scene during which Jason’s friends ask if he has his 
“rag on” (Ginger Snaps 2000) after noticing a blood stain 
on the front of his khakis. Crucial to note here, though, 
is Miller’s conflation of bleeding with gender—menses 
with “woman.” Rather, such a scene represents a dis-
cursively-produced and naturalized female sex-specific 
process imposed upon an apparently male body at its 
most significant and stabilizing site—that of the geni-
tals. Perhaps, then, Jason represents, not the castrated 
male/hysterical woman, but the one-sex model Lacquer 
(1990) locates as dominant prior to the eighteenth cen-
tury. Such a reading destabilizes the sexed body distinc-
tion by blurring absolute difference and undermining 
discursive productions of stable sex distinctions. 
Additionally, Ginger, complete with the three 
sets of nipples mentioned earlier, also possesses a phal-
lus in the film. Peeking out from her underwear while 
she sleeps is an animated tail that grows as Ginger trans-
forms into werewolf. Restabilizing the female form and 
its conflation with specific gendered elements, MacDon-
ald (2011) reads Ginger’s tail as a failure, as reflective 
of the inability to mesh the “fabulously femme Ginger” 
with the werewolf body in its masculine form—bestial, 
muscular, hairy (70). Such a “visual strategy is used to 
sidestep the issue of the animal body and femininity” 
(70), states MacDonald. She argues that Ginger’s tail 
actually acts as a “feline codification of femininity”—
similar to that used in other horror films—that reflects 
Ginger not as half woman, half wolf, but a less threat-
ening visual of “half-woman, half-cat” (70). In thinking 
beyond the static binary of sexed difference and its con-
flation with scripted gendered performativity, however, 
what is so intriguing about Ginger’s tail is that the phal-
lic appendage is an unnecessary addition to the were-
wolf formula. Werewolf historian Adam Douglas (1992) 
argues that, since the twentieth century, werewolf films 
have employed the distinction between the wolf and the 
werewolf popular since the sixteenth century; the most 
common distinctive mark between the two is that the 
werewolf has no tail. Ginger Snaps, however, accentu-
ates the tail; it continues to grow in length and width, 
making it necessary to be bound or else discovered. 
With black electrical tape in hand, Brigitte tapes down 
Ginger’s tail, attempting to make the bulge it produces 
invisible before gym class. And later during her trans-
formation, Ginger, in a vulnerable state of self-loathing, 
attempts an amputation of her symbolic penis. But the 
werewolf body in transition, despite its residual human 
desire to adhere to the proper map of absolute sex dis-
tinction, refuses to be contained.
Both Jason and Ginger in werewolf transition 
can be read as monstrous embodiments of opposites 
able to destabilize the binary inherent in sex difference 
foundational to Miller’s (2005) and MacDonald’s (2011) 
analyses of empowered gender (woman) and sexual 
variance (lesbian). They are, rather, monstrous bodies 
that smash distinctions, that refuse categorization. Af-
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ter all, during transition into werewolf, each embodies 
sex characteristics typically understood as male and 
female simultaneously, characteristics designed tra-
ditionally to stabilize distinctions between the sexes. 
Their bodies represent not stability, but liminality, a 
suspended form of both and, therefore, neither. Their 
monstrous forms challenge the two-sex model discur-
sively-produced in and dominant since the eighteenth 
century, and, by extension, their bodies have the abil-
ity to threaten discourses of bodily integrity overall. In 
destabilizing the absolute body of sex distinction, the 
werewolf body threatens not only the binarized identi-
ty categories of man/woman, male/female, and human/
animal, but also the entire system of identity signs. The 
body, in other words, has been dislodged from its foun-
dational axis traditionally secured by discourses based 
in binary logic, inherently invested in not only exclu-
sion through difference, but also in the devaluation of 
particular bodies (Heyes 2000). Arguably, then, not 
unlike the poststructural approach initiated by femi-
nists such as Butler (1990, 1993, 1996) and Nicholson 
(1994), readings of Ginger Snaps that deconstruct the 
static female body can actually open up possibilities and 
connections between marginalized subjects under the 
trope of the werewolf. Indeed, what of the intersexed 
subject? What of the transsexual subject? Or the subject 
of self-demand amputation? Do these bodies and their 
subjectivities not surface once the body is no longer se-
cured in stasis? That is, once it is no longer determined 
by discourses of bodily integrity that inherently exclude 
and devalue? Can Ginger Snaps be read as empower-
ing various identity-subjects at the site of the werewolf 
body?  
The parallels are there, for sure. Reading the 
body as an unstable variable threatens all institutional-
ly-sanctioned truths that secure the body as knowable 
in Western discourse. Recovering further marginalized 
identity subjects at the unstable body, however, also 
participates in further identity-based analyses that in-
herently exclude and, unfortunately, those that may also 
stabilize identity at the site of the monster. Rather than 
“anchor” the monster, poststructuralism insists on its 
mobility (Halberstam 2006, 5). Identity-based readings 
tend to exclude not only Others external to the identi-
ty included, but can exclude from within identity for-
mations as well. Poststructural feminist theory argues 
convincingly that there is simply no singular authentic 
experience, commonality, body, or voice amongst wom-
en, for instance. So, too, there is no singular experience, 
representation, or reading that can possibly speak to all 
subjects who identify with any identity category. Even 
when considering Miller’s (2005) and MacDonald’s 
(2011) analyses that recover empowerment in women 
and lesbians, one must recognize that not all women 
of female embodiment menstruate, nor do all lesbians 
desire relationships “together-forever.” The recovery of 
various marginalized subject-identities at the site of the 
werewolf, in other words, may actually reestablish reg-
ulatory regimes of rigid definition inherent in identity 
formation. As Donna Haraway (1992) argues, identity 
formation perpetually “invites the illusion of essential, 
fixed position[s]” (300). She writes, “‘Who am I?’ is 
about (always unrealizable) identity, always wobbling, 
it still pivots on the law of the father” (324). Rather than 
emphasize the distinctness of identities, Haraway argues 
for a cyborg subject position generated from “the belly 
of the monster,” a subject that does not make sense of 
the world through the separation of “technical, organic, 
mythic, textual, and political threads,” but one that rec-
ognizes the “absurdity” of such distinctions (300). It is 
from within the monster, then, that the ability to decon-
struct rigid distinctions is generated.
The Subject of Difference Dismantled
As mapped above, the werewolf body in Gin-
ger Snaps has the potential to fracture the rigid identity 
distinctions against which Haraway (1992) writes. For 
as Butler (1993) argues, sex difference is a normative 
technology by which one actually becomes an identi-
ty-subject. And the identities of “girl,” “woman,” and 
“lesbian” recovered by Miller (2005) and MacDonald 
(2011) certainly wobble once the werewolf ’s body re-
flects sex distinction as inconsistent and unstable. De-
constructing any singular truth of the body, therefore, 
reveals identity politics as limited. But is the exposure of 
identity as dependent on the discursively-produced sta-
ble body enough to forward a productive politic? Har-
away (2008) builds on her previous cyborgian theory 
in When Species Meet, producing an intervention into 
posthuman theory that may prove productive here. She 
engages with the triptych of human-animal-machine 
(that the Hollywood werewolf embodies) and forwards 
the practice of “becoming with” as an ethics with an em-
phasis on the human subject’s responsibility for species 
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historically produced as sub-human and, therefore, in-
ferior (35). At the core of becoming-with, then, is a pro-
cess of deconstruction that implicates the human sub-
ject in not only re/producing hierarchical value systems 
of species, but also in the responsibility for rethinking 
the relationship between the subject and Others as one 
of accountable social connection, as one of companion-
ship. At the intersection of feminist and monster theory, 
Margrit Shildrick’s (2002) approach to deconstructing 
the monstrous generates a similar ethical stance, but 
does so by first recognizing what Cohen (1996) refers 
to as the monster’s ability “to destroy…the very cultur-
al apparatus through which individuality is constituted 
and allowed” (12). Shildrick locates the political power 
of the monster in its ability to eradicate difference be-
tween the subject and Other in order to destabilize the 
human subject.
Shildrick (2002) locates the ability to decon-
struct particular distinctions at the site of the monster. 
“Unashamedly postmodern” in her approach, her pri-
mary objective is the dismantling of the “violent hier-
archy” that Jacques Derrida refers to as the binary log-
ic foundational to a Western logic of difference (4-5). 
While she recognizes feminist identity-based readings 
like those by Miller (2005) and MacDonald (2011) that 
locate empowerment in the monstrous female Other 
in Ginger Snaps, Shildrick (2002) argues that “the body 
that is recovered in its difference, remains highly nor-
mative” (2). These feminist approaches, “in their desire 
to establish an adequate alternative to masculinist stan-
dards,” tend also to recover female bodies and subjects 
that “instantiate new norms of sexuality, production 
or reproduction” (2). Recovering (and celebrating) fe-
male empowerment in Ginger’s monstrous anti-het-
eronormative practices, as Foucault (1979) has noted 
of identity-based narratives, participates in not only a 
counter discourse in which the female body seemingly 
gains value formerly denied, but also a process dictated 
by the regulatory regime of the normal in which liber-
ation is merely illusory. And it is the discourse of nor-
mative embodiment, according to Shildrick (2002), that 
guarantees the modern subject “individual autonomous 
selfhood” at the expense of producing the body of the 
Other as abnormal, as monstrous (2).
Significantly, Shildrick (2002) notes that, as long 
as “the monstrous remains the absolute other in its cor-
poreal difference it poses few problems” to the secure 
modern subject (2). It is only when the monster blurs 
distinctions, when the monstrous represents an inde-
terminate location that is neither Self nor Other to the 
stable, valued (non-monstrous) modern subject, that 
the monster is “deeply disturbing” (3). Identity-based 
readings that recover and expand the new normal, 
then, act to re-stabilize, to fix, the difference between 
the modern subject and Other, generating such a dis-
tance between them that such a power dynamic is far 
from threatened. While Shildrick certainly recognizes 
identities of difference located at the site of the Other, 
her objective is not to recover each in its difference, but 
to deconstruct the systemics foundational to all mon-
strosity, which she locates in the process of exclusion 
that preserves the modern subject’s hierarchical value. 
Rather than “revaluing differently embodied 
others,” Shildrick (2002) focuses on “rethinking” em-
bodiment itself (2). She targets the discursively-pro-
duced subject as both an effect of the Subject/Other 
power dynamic as well as its perpetuator. Key to the 
discursive production of the modern subject since the 
seventeenth century is the prioritizing of reason and a 
“masculinist retreat from the body and embodiment” 
(1). The Cartesian mind/body split that privileges rea-
son over corporality engenders an embodied subject 
position in which reason, and reason only, controls 
the inferior and potentially erratic body-object. The 
body of the valued modern subject is a body bound, its 
boundaries of definition allegedly secured and stabi-
lized by unwavering reason. This traditional perception 
of the valued modern subject, according to Shildrick, 
maintains an understanding of the monstrous Other as 
always a body external to the self. It is only when the 
monstrous Other is perceived as within that the destabi-
lization of modern subjectivity occurs. And it is only the 
encounter with the monster that “traverses the liminal 
spaces that evade classification” that has the “potential to 
confound normative identity” (5; emphasis added). The 
subject’s self-presence, according to Derrida, is actually 
always-already unstable; it can never be fully secured 
because such a consciousness of presence is based on 
exclusions that it “must deny, and on which it relies” (5). 
The monster’s liminal location as neither Self nor Oth-
er perpetually haunts the subject as a trace within, or 
as supplement to the subject. This encounter with the 
liminal monster “opens up” the modern subject to the 
“risk of indifferentiation” and enables, in the process, 
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“the hope that oppressive identities might be interrupt-
ed” (5). 
Regarding Ginger Snaps, the werewolf, specif-
ically the human subject in the midst of transitioning 
into werewolf, occupies such a liminal position, but 
only temporarily. Granted, the werewolf can be read 
as an embodiment of human and animal and, in rep-
resenting this blurring of un/reasonable species serves 
the negative function to the modern subject of pure rea-
son. There is no denying the most significant staple of 
any werewolf film is the dismantling of the Cartesian 
privileging of mind over body. Werewolf films reflect 
a mind/body split, but one that, in opposition to that 
of the modern subject, in the end privileges body over 
mind and, hence, monstrosity and distance are main-
tained. Working to stabilize the werewolf as Other, too, 
is the filmic formula in which characters infected with 
the werewolf virus perceive their uncontrollable alter-
ation into a bestial body as a betrayal of the self. This 
traditional negative self-reflection included in the genre 
reestablishes what Susan Stryker and Nikki Sullivan 
(2009) argue is a somatechnics of bodily perception—a 
process of seeing and understanding determined by in-
stitutionally-sanctioned knowledges that enable certain 
bodies integrity while foreclosing others. However, spe-
cifically during transition, during the eye candy of the 
werewolf film that both attracts and repulses viewers, 
the monster occupies a physical state in between human 
and animal, in between subject and Other. The time and 
space of becoming-werewolf signify the residue of both 
subject and Other simultaneously in a singular body 
and, therefore, can be fixed as neither. Not unlike C. Ja-
cob Hale’s (1998) theorizing of the borderland dweller, 
the transitioning body, if understood as having a subject 
at all in a culture dominated by binary logic, can occu-
py only the Undead subjectivity of liminality—subjects 
who do not embody the full status of the subject (But-
ler 1993). The werewolf ’s embodied ambiguity during 
transition challenges divisions between subject and 
Other, human and animal, necessary to stabilize the 
modern subject whose body is allegedly self-contained, 
self-possessed, and, above all, bound by reason. During 
werewolf transformation, the modern subject/viewer 
confronts the illusory relationship of mind over body 
(which can never be sustained) and, in the process, rec-
ognizes the trace of the monster within—the failure of 
reason to control the body, or what Shildrick (2002) re-
fers to as the “vulnerabilities” of embodied being—that 
undermine any confirmation of secure subjectivity. The 
subject, in other words, literally loses ground and con-
fronts “disorientation” (Ahmed 2006). In turn, the sub-
ject’s distance from the Other collapses: the devalued 
Other is exposed as supplement to the subject, as the 
monster within.
Unlike Shildrick (2002), Creed (1993) employs 
Kristeva’s theory of the abject—that which haunts the 
modern subject’s autonomy and, therefore, must be dis-
carded—specifically to recover and empower “women” 
at the site of the made-monstrous maternal (bleeding) 
female body. Scholarship on Ginger Snaps with a focus 
on the parallel between Ginger’s menstruating body 
and werewolf transformation employs Creed’s mon-
strous-feminine in its emphasis on Ginger’s resistance 
to heteronormative maps and her empowerment in do-
ing so. According to Shildrick, however, identity-based 
readings that celebrate the empowerment of difference 
tend also to participate in the regulatory regime of the 
normal. And Creed’s theory of the monstrous-feminine, 
or any identity-based reading reliant on rigid sex differ-
ence, also risks the biological determinism that Nich-
olson (1994) argues assumes the female body as fixed 
in normalized sex difference. Such a foundation limits 
feminism’s political scope with its inherent exclusion of 
other marginalized subjects not located in such an es-
sentialized female form. But even in destabilizing Gin-
ger’s (and Jason’s) body, the various subjects uncovered 
are contained by further identity markers that exclude. 
And, as Shildrick argues, stabilizing these subject-iden-
tities produces the Other/s as innocuous by extending 
the nonthreatening distance between subject and the 
(fixed) Other. 
Perhaps, then, the final transformation scene 
in Ginger Snaps—a mere twenty two seconds dominat-
ed by the Undead subject—not quite Ginger, nor quite 
werewolf—can be read most productively as a scene 
during which the modern subject/viewer confronts the 
unbound body of the liminal Other, the subject/self for-
merly denied. Perhaps this is the political moment of the 
horror film during which the subject recognizes such an 
exclusion as illusory, a space in which privileged sub-
jectivity can be interrupted. Shildrick (2002) dismantles 
hierarchical subject difference at the site of the body, but 
not to erase difference. Rather embodiment here is re-
signified as ambiguous, no longer reflective of fixity and 
hierarchical value. With such a poststructural approach, 
all bodies and, therefore, all subjects, fail the parameters 
of valued modern subjectivity based in the distinctions 
of binary logic. Such a failure, though, is what connects 
morphological diversity with the practice of diffraction, 
a mapping of “interference, not replication, reflection 
or reproduction” (Haraway 1992, 300). For, as Haraway 
(1992) contends, such is the promise of monsters.
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